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Making Peace Agreements Work:
United Nations Experience in the
Former Yugoslavia
Barry Ashton*
It might be said with only slight exaggeration that peacekeeping works only
when it is not necessary-in other words, when enemies have more or less
agreed to stop fighting. In such situations, Blue Helmets can provide the
final impetus toward peace and supervise established arrangements. But it
cannot work in a cockpit like Bosnia, as U.N. officials themselves warned
three years ago. Nevertheless, the Security Council, with the support of the
U.S., imposed a mission that mixed peacekeeping with humanitarian aid. It
ensured the present debacle by sending in totally inadequate forces, with
NATO in an absurd supporting role. 1




In April 1992, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a U.N.
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of 10,400 military and 2,740 support per-
sonnel.3 Committed initially to Croatia, UNPROFOR intervened in an
unresolved conflict, where it was not clear that the parties were truly com-
mitted to a peaceful resolution of the dispute. With an initial mandate of a
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1. Henry Grunwald, When Peacekeeping Doesn't Work, TIME, June 26, 1995, at 82.
2. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
749 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23900 (1992).
3. S.C. Res. 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3066th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/749
(1992).
30 CORNELL INT' LJ. 769 (1997)
Cornell International Law Journal
twelve-month engagement, UNPROFOR was intended to create the neces-
sary conditions for the pursuit of political negotiations which would lead
to a peaceful settlement. The mission was founded on the premise that a
peacekeeping force, established under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter,
could operate effectively in an area where there was no peace to keep. Yet,
until the initialing of the Dayton Peace Accords on November 21, 1995,
three and one-half years after the deployment of UNPROFOR, a compre-
hensive peace agreement for the former Yugoslavia did not exist and fight-
ing continued. Moreover, operations were conducted in a complex mix of
inter- and intra-state conflict in which some of the parties were non-
sovereigns.
Over the period, 213 U.N. soldiers died and 1,751 were wounded or
injured.4 Nonetheless, human suffering was eased, aid was delivered, fight-
ing was sometimes reduced, face-to-face negotiations between the belliger-
ents were facilitated, the conflict was contained within the borders of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, fighting was prevented in Macedonia,
and lives were saved. Efforts to stabilize the situation were not solely the
responsibility of the U.N. Throughout most of the period, U.N. forces
operated alongside personnel from the European Community, NATO, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.N. High Com-
mission for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
other international aid and human rights monitoring organizations. Addi-
tionally, as people from these organizations labored in the field, peacemak-
ers from the International Committee on the Former Yugoslavia, the
Contact Group and others tried to reach a peaceful solution to the
conflicts.
Arguably, this U.N. mission was of greater scope and complexity than
any U.N. mission ever undertaken. Over its course, the UNPROFOR man-
date was extended to five of the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. By
July 1992, U.N. troops had deployed to the Sarajevo area of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to ensure the security and functioning of the airport and the
delivery of humanitarian supplies.5 In December 1992, the presence of
UNPROFOR was further extended to Macedonia. 6 By August 1995, the
Force reached a strength of more than 47,000 troops. 7 The Security Coun-
cil enacted more than 100 resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia,
no less than 40 (on average, nearly one per month) of which were mandate
enhancements directly affecting the Force's strength, deployment, and
tasks. Frequent changes made impossible demands on the Force and gen-
erated a view among many that the Security Council treated resolutions as
though they were self-fulfilling. As the conflicts evolved, the U.N. mandate
became increasingly irrelevant in the eyes of the parties and many in the
4. UNITED NATIONS, FORCE COMMANDER'S END OF MISSION REPORT 1 (1996).
5. A Security Council Resolution authorized this deployment. S.C. Res. 761, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3087th mtg., 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/761 (1992).
6. S.C. Res. 795, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3147th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/795
(1992).
7. UNTED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 1.
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international community. There was little prospect for a military solution
and, sometimes, an absence of political or diplomatic momentum that
might lead to a peaceful settlement. Contributing nations and the interna-
tional community at large found the situation increasingly intolerable. The
parties to the conflicts refused to accept responsibility for the situation,
choosing instead to blame the United Nations. U.N. credibility was in
jeopardy.
When the balance sheet on the U.N. operation in the former Yugosla-
via is finally tallied, it may be possible to determine whether that operation
was a success or a failure. Pending a full accounting, lessons can be
applied to the formulation and implementation of peace agreements and
for the future of both U.N. and multilateral peacekeeping operations. This
Article addresses aspects of the U.N. operation and describes the lessons
that can be learned from that operation, particularly those lessons that
apply at the politico-military level.
I. Conditions for Success in Peacekeeping Operations
Success in peacekeeping operations depends on many factors. In An
Agenda for Peace, the then U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
set out five basic conditions for success:
The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years.
The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded
flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success
remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the
parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Secur-
ity Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police
and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United
Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial
and logistic support.8
In the former Yugoslavia, each of these basic conditions for success was
compromised in some fashion at one time or another. A case could be
made that these conditions were never met in a manner which offered a
reasonable prospect for success. Had these basic conditions been applied
rigidly at the outset, the force might never have been deployed. In recom-
mending the establishment of UNPROFOR, the Secretary-General stressed
that the danger that a peacekeeping force would fail for lack of cooperation
from the parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch
would lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration. 9
UNPROFOR was established as the lesser of two evils.
Conditions for success are guidelines for action, not measures of suc-
cess achieved. Ultimate success can be judged only by the extent to which
the mandate of the force was implemented. However, an understanding of,
8. BouTRos BouTRos-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE at 29, U.N. Sales No. DPI/1247
(1992).
9. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
721, 47th Sess., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/23592 (1992).
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and respect for, these basic conditions for achieving peace is essential to
framing and implementing Security Council resolutions and peace agree-
ments. If the objective set out in Resolution 743, "an interim arrangement
to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation
of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis,"10 is the measure, then it
might be argued that the U.N. mission was a success. On the other hand,
the mission failed to create these conditions in the twelve-month period
originally authorized. Moreover, the U.N. failed in a number of its man-
dated tasks. To examine the reasons for failure, certain aspects of the mis-
sion are set against the basic conditions for success.
II. Testing the Conditions for Success: An Analysis of the United
Nations Experience in the Former Yugoslavia
A. A Clear and Practicable Mandate
The formulation of clear and achievable mandates for peacekeeping forces,
especially pertaining to the precise relationship between political objec-
tives and military means and resources, is a simple concept. In the former
Yugoslavia, no such mandate evolved. From the outset, in the absence of a
comprehensive peace agreement, U.N. forces found themselves in an
ambiguous situation with difficult and complex, sometimes impossible,
tasks. The absence of a clear and practicable mandate exacerbated the dif-
ficulty of their tasks as fighting continued and spread. Efforts at furthering
the peace process were thwarted and the overall complexity of the situation
increased. Ambiguity might have been eased if there had been direct mili-
tary advice and involvement in both the initial and subsequent mandate
formulation. Such involvement could have helped to ensure that Security
Council resolutions provided clear military objectives which were consis-
tent with the resources available, while establishing realistic milestones for
the implementation of those objectives. With the exception of agreements
made on the ground and subsequently recognized by the Security Council,
there was seldom sound military advice available to the Security Council.
When military advice was proffered, it was often ignored.
As with other recent peacekeeping operations, such as those in
Somalia and Rwanda, the United Nations intervened in what was a compli-
cated mdange of civil and international war. Not all of the parties had
standing in the eyes of the international community. Within some of the
parties, there were rogue or "uncontrollable" elements. UNPROFOR was
confronted by a number of paramilitary groups, militias, and other ele-
ments operating independently from internationally recognized govern-
ments and negotiating authorities. In some cases, these groups had not
been a party to mandate formulation, did not agree with aspects of the
mandate, and actively opposed UNPROFOR efforts to implement its man-
dated tasks. Despite the fact that these groups lacked "official" standing,
UNPROFOR had to deal with them. Some criticized senior UNPROFOR
10. S.C. Res. 743 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743
(1992).
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officials and commanders for meeting with political and military leaders
indicted as "war criminals" by the international community. Attempts to
implement the mandate dictated that communication be established and
maintained with all of the parties, indicted war criminals or not. Senior
UNPROFOR officials and commanders did not enjoy the luxury of choos-
ing those individuals appointed to represent their interests.
Perhaps the best proof that the mandate was both unclear and
unachievable, given the resources allocated to it, is the mandate for the
"safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina authorized under Security Council
Resolutions 819,11 824,12 83613 and 844.14 The "safe areas" of Bihac,
Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa were to be free from armed
attacks and other hostile acts threatening damage to the well-being and
safety of their inhabitants or impeding delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Based on military advice from U.N. commanders, the Secretary-General
estimated that approximately 34,000 additional troops would be required
to ensure full respect for the "safe areas," three of which were enclaves on
Bosnian Serb controlled territory in Eastern Bosnia.' 5 Taking into account
the amount of troops and material resources likely to be made available to
UNPROFOR, the Security Council, in Resolution 844, authorized a "light
option" of about 7,600 troops. 16 The "light option" would not guarantee
the protection of the "safe areas," but it would provide a basic level of deter-
rence, assuming that the parties consented and cooperated. A year later, in
1994, the troop level in the "safe areas" still totaled less than the 7,600
troops authorized. Nations that contributed troops were unwilling to pro-
vide troops for this task. Moreover, the consent and cooperation of the
parties assumed in Resolution 844 never existed.
The Bosnian army used the "safe areas" as the location for military
headquarters and as a firm base to train, rehabilitate forces, and launch
military operations. When a "safe area" has significance for military opera-
tions and its use as such threatens the security of another party, it may be
unrealistic to expect that party to refrain from conducting military opera-
tions against the area. Agreement by the Bosnian Muslims to demilitarize
Srebrenica was not extended to the other areas and was not even honored
in Srebrenica. UNPROFOR efforts to protect the "safe areas" appeared to
be aimed at obstructing only one of the parties. UNPROFOR lost its impar-
tiality and became a party to the conflict, at least in the perception of the
party being obstructed, the Bosnian Serbs.
11. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819
(1993).
12. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., 1I 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824
(1993).
13. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., 1I 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993).
14. S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3241th mtg., cl 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/844
(1993).
15. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836, 48th
Sess., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25939 (1993).
16. S.C. Res. 844, supra note 14, 1 2.
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The decisions taken by NATO in response to a request from the U.N.
Secretary-General were key to the "safe area" concept. NATO decided to
extend the military exclusion zone it had established around Sarajevo to
Gorazde and to do likewise for Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa if, in the
"common judgment of the NATO Military Commanders and U.N. Military
Commanders, there is a concentration or movement of heavy weapons
within a radius of 20 kilometers of these areas."'17 NATO decided to
respond to violations of these exclusion zones with air attacks. Resolution
836, paragraph 10, authorized the use of "all necessary measures," a Chap-
ter VII authority, by NATO. 18 This permitted the use of force in cases other
than self-defense, such as for peace enforcement. The mixing of peace
enforcement with peacekeeping made the character of operations ambigu-
ous, as the parties were unable or unwilling to distinguish between peace
enforcement and peacekeeping.
In July 1995, the world watched as the Bosnian Serbs seized Srebren-
ica, then Zepa. These attacks were due, at least in part, to the military use
of these areas by the Bosnian army. The Bosnian Serbs justified these
attacks on the basis of self-defense. The Bosnian government exploited
Bosnian Serb attacks to internationalize their plight. Bosnian military
operations from Srebrenica and Zepa had been undertaken by their forces
to elicit a response from the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Serb attacks were
then used to accuse the international community of doing too little, too
late. When the Bosnian Serbs attacked Srebrenica, approximately 8,000 to
12,000 Bosnian army troops withdrew with hardly a shot fired in
defense. 19 Then, the Bosnian government and many in the media accused
approximately 400 Dutch U.N. troops of failing to "defend" the enclave. 20
Widespread condemnation of UNPROFOR for its lack of resolve to
"defend" the "safe areas" demonstrates the problems that can arise when
mandates are not formulated realistically nor resources allocated according
to the military realities. If the "safe areas" mandate was formulated with
the benefit of sound military advice or if the advice proffered after its for-
mulation was followed, the situation might have been quite different. The
Security Council assumption of cooperation by the parties had not existed
elsewhere and it was clear early that it would not exist for the "safe areas."
"Safe areas" which are not demilitarized and continue to have military sig-
nificance for military operations are not truly safe. The well-being and
safety of inhabitants cannot be protected when some of those inhabitants
17. Decisions on the Protection of Safe Areas taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, NATO/OTAN Press Release (94)32 (Brussels, Apr. 22, 1994).
18. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 13, 11 10. Paragraph 10 of this resolution uses the
language "Member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations or
arrangements." Id. This phrasing was understood to mean acting through NATO.
19. The figures used are estimates based upon several reports. See, e.g., Dutch Min-
istry of Defense, Serious war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs, Press-Summary
Debriefing Report, Oct. 30, 1995, at 1.
20. Id. at 1, 3. See also Bruce W. Nelan, Bombs and Bluster, TIME, July 31, 1995, at
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are engaged in military activity. Furthermore, in order to deter attacks, the
safe areas must have a credible defensive capability.
Peacekeeping operations must be governed by a clear understanding
of the political and military objectives, by the establishment of milestones
for the implementation of these objectives, and by the provision of the
means necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks. In the case of the "safe
areas," the objectives were impeded by a failure to demilitarize the areas,
because the resources allocated were inadequate for the task and because
of the non-cooperation of the parties.
B. Consent: The Cooperation of the Parties
The fundamental weaknesses of U.N. peacekeeping 2 ' were underscored by
operations in the former Yugoslavia, where only partial or sporadic consent
to intervention was ever granted by the parties to the conflicts. As demon-
strated by the failure of the "safe area" mandate, the premise of consent
was false. The general failure to obtain the consent of the parties raises the
question of whether UNPROFOR should have been withdrawn or the man-
date changed to accord with this reality. Withdrawal was an option, as
demonstrated by NATO/U.N. withdrawal planning begun in 1993.22 How-
ever, withdrawal would have entailed many risks. Realizing this, many in
the international community preferred to muddle-through rather than
clearly admit failure and face these risks. In the view of the international
community, the U.N. presence offered some hope for an eventual settle-
ment, no matter how faint.
1. Croatia
The U.N. operation in Croatia was established as a traditional Chapter VI
peacekeeping operation. The initial U.N.-negotiated peace plan 23 for Croa-
tia charged peacekeepers with monitoring the demilitarization of irregular
and paramilitary forces and the functioning of local police forces, as well as
overseeing the withdrawal of Federal Yugoslav Army forces from the U.N.
Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and
Krajina. However, it was not until approximately six months after the reali-
zation of the peace plan that U.N. forces were deployed and operational. In
the interim, it was left to a handful of military observers to monitor the
situation.
21. MATS R. BEDM., WHrrHER U.N. PEACEKEEING 10 (1993) (Adelphi Paper 281 pub-
lished by Int'l Institute for Strategic Studies, London) (promoting an insightful analysis
of the fundamental weaknesses of U.N. peacekeeping).
22. Withdrawal planning was an extension of the planning begun in 1993 by NATO
which indicated a willingness to undertake implementation of the Vance-Owen peace
plan. The Vance-Owen plan was not accepted by the parties and planning for NATO
support of a U.N. withdrawal began.
23. Negotiated by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Cyrus Vance. Agreement
to an immediate cease-fire and other issues was reached in Geneva on November 23,
1991. The Security Council approved the plan. S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
3023d mtg., '1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (1991).
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 30
Demilitarization of the UNPAs required, for example, that specified
weapons be placed in secure storage sites under a "double-key" system with
U.N. guards manning these sites. Non-cooperation by Serb militias
ensured that demilitarization was never fully effective. The Secretary-Gen-
eral observed that, for a political settlement to be reached, "not only a
working cease-fire but also clear and unconditional acceptance of the plan
by all concerned, with equally clear assurances of their readiness to coop-
erate in its implementation" was essential.2 4 The assumption of consent
proved flawed and the U.N. presence itself was passively and actively
obstructed, undermined, and opposed. Croatia was able to re-arm and
train a force which, by May and August 1995, was sufficient to seize con-
trol of the UNPAs in Western Slavonia and Krajina, in violation of the man-
date and the March 29, 1994, cease-fire agreement. Hundreds of
thousands of Serbs fled from Croatia. Croatia was able to achieve milita-
rily what the peacemakers and peacekeepers themselves had failed to
achieve.
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were also repeated violations of agree-
ments. For example, the initiative by President Carter in late-1994 led to
an agreement for the cessation of hostilities beginning on January 1,
1995.25 The agreement included provisions for a monitoring and supervi-
sory regime, the exchange of liaison officers with UNPROFOR, the separa-
tion of forces, prohibitions on the use and location of munitions and
weapons, the granting of full freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and
other international agencies, and full respect for the safety and security of
UNPROFOR and related personnel. The agreement also included provi-
sions requiring respect for all existing agreements which included eight
agreements dating back to the Sarajevo Airport Agreement of June 5, 1992,
normalization of life, the early release of detained persons, and coopera-
tion with UNPROFOR in monitoring the withdrawal of all foreign troops.2 6
The agreement was made without prejudice to a final political or territorial
solution. However, there is no evidence of a concentrated political or diplo-
matic effort to cement this agreement in a final solution. Within weeks, as
a result of non-compliance and general non-cooperation by the parties, the
agreement began to break down. The Secretary-General reported that
while some progress was made in certain aspects of the agreement, little
progress was achieved inJanuary 1995 on provisions dealing with the sep-
aration of forces, inter-positioning of UNPROFOR troops, and the with-
drawal of heavy weapons.2 7 By April, the agreement had completely
broken down and large-scale fighting had resumed.
24. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
721, at 7, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23592 (1992).
25. Agreement on the Complete Cessation of Hostilities, Dec. 31, 1994.
26. Id.
27. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 947
(1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 23, U.N. Doc. S/1995/222 (1995).
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On May 9, 1995, Karadzic, the Bosnian-Serb leader, made it clear that
in the event of NATO air action, the U.N. forces would be treated as ene-
mies. He confirmed that the Bosnian Serb army had decided to put the
United Nations under sanctions, blockading U.N. forces. This declaration
was made in response to indications of an impending Bosnian army offen-
sive to lift the siege of Sarajevo and as a result of Karadzic's determination
to prevent the United Nations from helping them succeed. The Bosnians
used Bosnian Serb intransigence over the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, the
U.N. failure to implement its mandate, and the removal of heavy weapons
by the Serbs to justify its offensive.
Even the title "Protection Force" itself created, in the minds of many,
false and often unrealistic expectations about the Force's true purpose.
Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the first Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR and
the first Commander of Sector Sarajevo in 1992, argued that the name
"Protection Force" led civilians in Sarajevo to expect protection for them-
selves, not simply for the humanitarian aid workers and convoys.28 Mac-
Kenzie further stated that the Bosnian presidency was perpetuating the
idea that the United Nations should take the Bosnian side in the conffict.
29
Similarly, in Croatia, many among the Serb population in the UNPAs
believed that the United Nations was there to protect them and felt betrayed
by what they saw as UNPROFOR's failure to do so. Not only were the U.N.
forces deployed in the UNPAs without the resources to provide protection,
but they did not have the mandate, as examination of Resolution 981
reveals.30 Mandated tasks included monitoring the March 29, 1994, cease-
fire agreement between the Republic of Croatia and local Serb authorities,
facilitating the implementation of the economic agreement, monitoring
and reporting on military movement across the borders with Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, assisting in the deliv-
ery of humanitarian supplies to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and monitoring
the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula.
3 1
In 1994 and 1995, it was clear that Croatian military personnel were
operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina alongside Bosnian Croat forces, con-
trary to the agreement made to respect the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Croatia maintained that it had no formed units in Bosnia.
Evidence showed otherwise, but UNPROFOR was unable to prove this con-
clusively due to its inability to move sufficient observers into key positions
on the border and into Western Bosnia. Misunderstandings, mispercep-
tions, and deceit increased the pressure on the United Nations and affected
its credibility in the eyes of the parties to the conflict. When the mandate
became impossible to implement, the parties tended to blame the United
28. Lms MACKENZIE, PEACEKEEPEP THE RoAD TO SARAJEVo 292 (1993).
29. Id.
30. S.C. Res. 981, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3512th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/981
(1995). Resolution 981 was an updated version of a number of resolutions which had
extended and modified the original mandate for the U.N. mission in Croatia.
31. Id.
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Nations when, in fact, the parties themselves failed to honor commitments
and actively resisted U.N. efforts to implement its mandated tasks.
C. Freedom of Movement
Freedom of movement, an aspect of consent and an achievable Chapter VI
mandate, provides a peacekeeping force with an indispensable tool for car-
rying out its tasks. Freedom'of movement is essential to policing cease-
fires, delivering humanitarian supplies, monitoring the deployment of mili-
tary forces, and supplying the peacekeeping force. In Croatia, most U.N.
troops lived and operated from Serb-controlled territory. Thus, they
depended upon the cooperation of the Serbs for movement within the
UNPAs and to and from the zone of separation. When Serbian cooperation
was withdrawn and UNPROFOR was unable to enforce compliance, the
Croats believed that the force lacked impartiality.
In order to monitor Croat compliance with the cease-fire agreement, it
was necessary to patrol on the Croat side of the zone of separation. Lim-
ited access across the zone, restrictions on the movement of military
observers who operated on Croatian territory, and general non-cooperation
on the part of the Croats made monitoring of the cease-fire agreement diffi-
cult. It became impossible in May and August of 1995 as Croats massed
troops in preparation for their offensives. The offensive against the Krajina
was facilitated by forces operating in Western Bosnia, which directly
threatened Serbs in the Krajina and threatened to cut off links to Bosnian
Serb controlled territory and escape routes out of Croatia.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, freedom of movement was similarly
restricted. By June 1995, Bosnian Serbs had restricted freedom of move-
ment to the extent that UNPROFOR was unable to operate in Bosnian Serb
controlled territory. As a result, the United Nations could not supply
troops to the "safe area" enclaves of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa.
Humanitarian supplies were blockaded and the force's attempts to monitor
compliance with agreements were thwarted. The Bosnian Serbs restricted
freedom of movement to control and punish UNPROFOR, to demonstrate
sovereignty, to gain relief from sanctions, to control and punish "safe area"
populations, and to increase their share of humanitarian aid. The Bosnian
Government and the Federation denied freedom of movement to control
UNPROFOR, to gain security for offensive actions, and to prevent
UNPROFOR from manning observation posts near areas of operational
activity.
These restrictions limited the vital flow of humanitarian aid and put
the "safe area" mandate in the enclaves at risk. The restrictions also lim-
ited the UNPROFOR's ability to monitor compliance with agreements.
Without freedom of movement, U.N. troops in the enclaves were, effec-
tively, held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs who surrounded the enclaves.
UNPROFOR lacked the means to guarantee freedom of movement or to
control the escalation that almost certainly would have resulted had it
imposed its will. Restrictions on freedom of movement were directed from
the highest level of each of the parties. Declarations of "deep concern"
Vol. 30
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from New York 3 2 did not change the situation on the ground. With neither
freedom of movement nor the means to enforce it, U.N. troops were hand-
cuffed in their efforts to carry out many of their tasks.
As the drift towards an aggravated form of peacekeeping continues, so
too does the existence of consent come into question.3 3 Meaningful con-
sent was absent from U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia. In the
absence of this vital ingredient of a Chapter VI operation, the cornerstone
of the mandate, some might question why the Security Council did not
withdraw the force, adjust its mandate to reflect the reality, or provide the
force with the means to enforce its mandate.
D. Continuing Support of the Security Council
The support of the Security Council, another condition for success, can be
demonstrated in many ways. The Security Council's principle role in
peacekeeping is the formulation of a vision and the provision of strategic
direction for the operation. The Security Council manages peacekeeping
operations through the Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretariat. The
direction of the Security Council, implemented through its resolutions,
must-be backed by the resources necessary to achieve that direction. While
the Security Council does not provide resources directly, it does have the
responsibility to consult, directly or through the Secretariat, with those
who do-the General Assembly for budgetary matters and the troop con-
tributing nations for the provision of troops. Relating to the former Yugo-
slavia, consultation and management seemed inadequate because
UNPROFOR often lacked the resources necessary to carry out its mandate
effectively.
A number of UNPROFOR's failures and problems can be traced to the
Security Council. Among these was a seeming unwillingness to recognize
the reality that member states would not furnish additional troops to this
ambiguous and risky operation. In terms of the quantity and quality of
troops required to undertake the mandate, troop contributing nations were
not forthcoming in meeting the needs. Second, financial limitations con-
strained the possibilities for fully implementing the mandate. Finally, as
discussed in relation to the "safe areas," the Council did not seek or use
military advice provided by the Secretary-General in the framing of its
resolutions.
Advice offered on other matters by the Secretary-General, based on the
advice of U.N. commanders, was also ignored. For example, by late May
1995, a deteriorating security situation, the failure of NATO air attacks of
May 25 and May 26 to make a difference on the ground, the hundreds of
U.N. troops held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, and the widespread criti-
32. See, for example, Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1995/31 (1995). The Statement was issued in response
to the blockading of Ukrainian troops in Gorazde and Canadian troops in Visoko by
Bosnian Muslim elements.
33. Richard Connaughton, Time to Clear the Doctrine Dilemma, JANe'S D ' aErc
W LY., Apr. 9, 1994, at 19.
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cism of the U.N. provided the context for the Secretary-General to report to
the Security Council.34 He presented, in paragraph 72, four discrete
options for the future of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a) with-
drawal; b) continue on the same course (muddle through); c) change the
mandate to permit greater use of force; or d) change the mandate to include
only those tasks which a peacekeeping force realistically could be expected
to perform.35 These options were presented with the advice and backing of
the Force Commander and the Commander of the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Command.
The Secretary-General did not favor withdrawal except as an option of
last resort because he considered it an abandonment of the Bosnian people,
who had already endured enough suffering. Similarly, he did not favor
muddling through. The greater use of force, he stated, would require
replacing UNPROFOR with a multinational force. In paragraph 79, he
identified a change of the mandate as the only realistic option for the
United Nations. The Security Council ignored all of the options and
attempted combining "muddling through" with a greater use of force by
authorizing the creation of a rapid reaction force. 36 Though the Security
Council faced a difficult decision, this response illustrated its lack of sup-
port for a mission it created.
E. Adequate and Effective Forces
1. Adequate Troop Strength
As with the "safe areas," advice on the number of troops required to under-
take a mandated task was apparently ignored. Security Council authorized
force levels that were either not fully achieved or achieved only after
lengthy delays. This meant that new tasks were undertaken at reduced
levels by troops already on the ground and at the expense of existing tasks,
consequently diluting effectiveness. An inability to assume new tasks
quickly with effective troops meant that operational momentum to follow
up agreements or to seize opportunities was lost.
Not only is it important that sufficient troop strength exist to carry out
the tasks assigned, but the timely arrival of these troops in a state capable
of undertaking operations without undue delay is also critical to success.
Peacekeeping troops must be combat capable, particularly for a theater
such as the former Yugoslavia. These troops also must have specialized
peacekeeping training and must be properly equipped. Many of
UNPROFOR's contingents lacked the equipment necessary to operate effec-
tively in a war zone like the former Yugoslavia. Inadequate armor protec-
tion and firepower led to situations where the troops were unable to carry
out their tasks and were at unnecessary and unacceptable risk. As the
34. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutins 982 (1995)
and 987 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 1 72, U.N. Doc. S/1995/444 (1995).
35. Id.
36. The Rapid Reaction Force was authorized under Security Council Resolution
998. S.C. Res 998, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3543d mtg., 1 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/998
(1995).
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United Nations required more and more troops to fill its peacekeeping
mandates worldwide, it recruited troops from nations with little peacekeep-
ing experience. In a number of cases, units received both their training and
U.N.-provided equipment in-theater. Months might have passed after its
arrival before a unit was judged minimally capable operationally. Food,
accommodations, and maintenance cost the United Nations many millions
of dollars without the benefit of any operational utility. The United
Nations should accept only troops that are fully equipped, trained to U.N.
readiness standards, and operationally capable on arrival. Such prepared-
ness requires better troop stand-by arrangements between contributing
nations and the U.N. in order to facilitate the rapid deployment of effective
forces.
2. Rules Of Engagement
Rules of engagement (ROE), the means by which direction governing the
use of force is provided to troops, are an important aspect of force effective-
ness. Potentially, every use of force by a peacekeeping operation carries
with it significant political implications. ROE are framed within the provi-
sions of international and national law, including the mandates provided,
and, in the case of U.N. or U.N. authorized operations, by Security Council
resolutions. In Chapter VI operations, the use of force is limited to "the
minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence."37 Under
this definition, self-defense includes resistance to attempts by forceful
means to prevent a U.N.-authorized force from discharging its mandate.
Given the situation throughout much of the UNPROFOR area of opera-
tions, resistance to forceful efforts preventing the discharge of its mandate
would have required considerably heavier protection and armament and a
greater number of troops. If soldiers are to believe they can survive in such
a situation, their ROE and means for execution must be consistent.
Among the problems related to ROE was a lack of a common under-
standing of their meaning and, as a result, their inconsistent application.
National training and varying levels of experience, law, and practice some-
times meant that the same rules were used differently by different cont-
ingents in a similar circumstance. A second difficulty was the question of
the extent to which force could be used to protect non-U.N. personnel,
including civilians in protected and safe areas. For example, Resolution
836 provided no additional authority for the use of force to protect civilian
populations in the "safe areas."38 It may be that a new category of the
minimum use of force is emerging under Chapter VI peacekeeping in a
semi- or non-permissive environment which goes beyond the classic inter-
pretation limiting the use of force strictly to situations of self-defense. A
third problem relates to the authority for the use of force to protect prop-
erty. In aggravated peacekeeping operations, where banditry and hijacking
37. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721
(1991), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex III, para. 4., U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991).
38. See generally S.C. Res. 836, supra note 13. Review of this resolution shows a lack
of additional authority for peacekeepers, except some language in paragraph 9. Id.
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are not uncommon and where normal means of law enforcement are non-
existent or ineffective, it is necessary to have specific authority for using
force to protect property. Without such authority, U.N. or other
peacekeeping coalitions will face the prospect of continuous theft and
destruction of equipment essential to the mission.
3. Reserves
Until the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force, U.N. commanders did
not have a dedicated reserve to deal with unforeseen events. Many com-
manders compensated for this by "dual hatting" units which had other
responsibilities. While this provided a theoretical reserve, it reduced reac-
tion times, put other tasks at risk when reserves were called upon, and
meant that difficult compromises had to be made in decision-making. The
maintenance of a dedicated reserve is a time-tested military imperative. In
a dynamic, semi- or non-permissive environment, the existence of sector,
command, and theater reserves from the outset of the operation would
have provided commanders with the much needed flexibility to undertake
mandated tasks and the capability to deal with unforeseen events.
When it became operationally ready in August 1995, the Rapid Reac-
tion Force, consisting of 12,500 soldiers equipped with artillery, heavy
mortars, tanks, and armed helicopters, provided the force commander with
a potent capability to reinforce threatened U.N. forces.39 The Rapid Reac-
tion Force could have provided a substantial capability to cover the with-
drawal of U.N. troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina had this become
necessary. It also provided the means required to overcome resistance to
the implementation of aspects of the mandate. This was demonstrated dur-
ing "Operation Deliberate Force," the NATO-U.N. operation begun on
August 30, 1995. This operation was undertaken following the shelling of
the Sarajevo market on August 28. Its purpose was to force the Bosnian
Serbs to withdraw heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Rapid
Reaction Force artillery and heavy mortars, closely coordinated with NATO
air actions, engaged and, finally, brought about the removal of Bosnian
Serb heavy weapons. 40 Had this kind of a reserve been available earlier in
the mandate, as established military practice would dictate, the situation
might have unfolded quite differently.
F. Demilitarized Zones
Some form of demilitarization was a part of nearly every agreement
reached in the former Yugoslavia. Demilitarization had many variations.
The "Protected Areas" and "Zone of Separation" in Croatia and the "safe
areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina were three variations on the concept of
creating effective cease-fires. A fourth variation was the "exclusion zone"
agreement for heavy weapons around Sarajevo on February 9, 1994. This
agreement was struck in response to the large number of civilian casualties
39. Ebbing Force, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1995, at 44.
40. Bosnia: An End in Sight, At Last, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1995, at 43.
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caused by a mortar shell which had exploded in the main market in Sara-
jevo four days earlier. U.N. commanders insisted that the only realistic
option for preventing shelling of the Sarajevo area was the complete with-
drawal of all heavy weapons from areas within a twenty kilometer radius of
the city.4 1 On February 20, the Security Council met in an informal ses-
sion, at the request of the Russian Federation, and agreed that certain
weapons not removed from the exclusion zone could be monitored, in
place, by UNPROFOR. This compromise flawed the agreement, and, as
subsequent events proved, it became ineffective when the parties refused to
cooperate. Bosnian Muslim heavy weapons remained within Sarajevo.
Due to the paucity of U.N. resources available to monitor and control the
exclusion zone, the Bosnian Serbs could return unobserved the weapons
they had removed earlier. Moreover, those weapons that remained, despite
U.N. monitoring, were available for use when the parties chose to ignore
the agreement.
The establishment of demilitarized and controlled zones or areas can
best be undertaken effectively where the parties are willing to honor their
agreements. In the absence of such will, the peacekeeping force's capabil-
ity to adequately monitor and enforce the agreement becomes the indispen-
sable element of force effectiveness.
G. Effective Command
For all of its peacekeeping experience, the United Nations remains an
organization which patches together its missions on an ad hoc basis.
While some effort has been undertaken since 1991 to increase the military
staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Field Adminis-
tration and Logistics Department at U.N. headquarters, the United Nations
still lacks a dedicated military planning and operations staff. Furthermore,
UNPROFOR operations suffered from a complicated and sometimes
ambiguous chain of command.
1. Military Staff Committee
Although the U.N. Charter sees the role of the Military Staff Committee
only in the context of Chapter VII,4 2 the growing number and complexity
of peacekeeping operations provide a case for a dedicated military plan-
ning staff at, or adjacent to, U.N. headquarters. Without such a staff, U.N.
peacekeeping operations will likely continue to be ad hoc, and enacted res-
olutions will be ambiguous, bearing little meaning for forces on the
41. Other options considered could not guarantee that Sarajevo be free from shell-
ing. For an account of the events surrounding the establishment of the Sarajevo Weap-
ons Exclusion Zone, see UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SITUATION IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAvIA: REVOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND STATEMENT BY ITS PRESI-
DENT, 25 SEPTEMBER 1991-28 APRIL 1995, at 23-25 (1995).
42. In the context of Chapter VII, Article 46 of the U.N. Charter calls for the Security
Council to develop plans for applying force with the assistance of the Military Staff Com-
mittee. U.N. CHARTm art. 46. Article 47 sets out the Committee's terms of reference,
which include providing advice to the Council on readiness, planning and general mat-
ters of command, and strategic direction of forces. U.N. CHARTR art. 47.
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ground. Without such a staff, U.N. credibility in aggravated peacekeeping
operations will probably continue to suffer.
2. A Single Command Authority
UNPROFOR was a multifaceted operation requiring an integrated
approach to strategic direction and to the planning and execution of opera-
tions. A structure permitting and facilitating this integration did not exist.
There was never a single authority for operations in the former Yugoslavia.
Although the Security Council argulably led the operation, the tasks it
assigned NATO and the humanitarian tasks undertaken by a wide variety
of international agencies complicated a coherent approach to the manage-
ment of operations. Not only was an overall vision of what the interna-
tional community wished to achieve absent, but there was also no single
theater-level operational authority to coordinate and direct the achievement
of that vision.
The role of the Security Council is to formulate and direct the vision.
It cannot, and should not be expected to, plan and direct the execution of
operations. A separate body with links to the Security Council needs to be
established to undertake this role. It would function in a manner similar to
the way NATO's Military Committee functions in formulating advice to,
and interpreting the direction of, the North Atlantic Council and the
Defense Planning Committee. The Military Staff Committee concept is
sound, but it needs to be extended to all U.N. military operations, not just
Chapter VII operations.
U.N. troop-contributing nations assign their troops to the operational
control of U.N. commanders. This means that national forces are author-
ized by their government to carry out specific tasks as directed by U.N.
commanders for a specified period of time, normally the mandate period.
As the UNPROFOR mandate evolved, it became necessary to negotiate with
troop-contributing nations the assignment of new tasks for troops on the
ground. In some cases, these negotiations became protracted, without easy
solution. The "safe areas" provide perhaps the best example of these com-
plications. Months passed before the United Nations could find troops to
replace Canadians in Srebrenica; they were stationed there temporarily in
April 1993 and remained until March of 1994, when Dutch troops finally
replaced them. As the operation became more complex and risks
increased, nations became reluctant to allow U.N. commanders any free-
dom. The tendency for national governments to interfere or assume con-
trol for operational decisions increased, demonstrating a lack of
confidence in the Security Council and the U.N. chain of command. In
July 1995, for example, Dutch troops from Srebrenica were responding
directly to the Hague, perhaps understandably given the inability of U.N.
commanders to provide any assistance.
H. Intelligence
In a politically fluid and militarily complex peacekeeping operation, partic-
ularly in the absence of full consent by one or more of the parties, the
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means for collecting, analyzing and securely distributing intelligence are
vital to effective command. These means never reached a satisfactory level
in UNPROFOR. Simple information on minefields, convoy routes, and the
disposition of forces are vital to both effective decision-making and troop
safety. Effective, secure communications, essential to the passage of timely
information, were lacking. In aggravated peacekeeping operations, the pro-
vision of adequate and timely. intelligence is essential. Mandates and
resources allocated to peacekeeping operations in a semi- or non-permis-
sive environment must reflect the need for intelligence. The idea which
existed in traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations in largely permissive
environments, that intelligence is inconsistent with peacekeeping, is not
appropriate for aggravated peacekeeping operations such as those under-
taken by UNPROFOR.
I. NATO
The authority granted to "member states, acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements," in Security Council resolutions
gave NATO the authority to use "all necessary measures" to carry out speci-
fied operations alongside U.N. forces. Militarily, NATO has a well-tested
and formidable capability, as well as an effective command and control
apparatus. NATO is capable of undertaking a wide range of military opera-
tions over an expansive area. Early in the conflict, NATO units were
employed in monitoring the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
conducting maritime operations in support of U.N. sanctions against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In 1993, NATO
began the enforcement of the "no-fly zone"43 over Bosnia and Herzegovina
in response to Serb air strikes on civilian populations. Subsequently,
NATO was authorized to use air power to support the "safe area" mandate,
to protect the exclusion zones, and to provide close air support in defense
of threatened U.N. forces. NATO also undertook contingency planning to
implement the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and for operations in support of a
possible withdrawal of U.N. forces.44
NATO and U.N. commanders at the operational and tactical levels
established effective methods for coordinating planning and operations.
Similar coordination at the strategic level between Brussels and New York
was not evident. Failure to exchange liaison staffs between the two head-
quarters before 1995 caused misunderstandings, confusion, and conflict-
ing direction to troops on the ground. Much of the confusion and conflict
stemmed from differing interpretations of the "air strike" authority given
NATO for the "no-fly" zone, the "safe areas," and the exclusion zones.
Many troop contributing nations, within and outside of NATO, believed
that the exercise of this authority would place U.N. peacekeeping forces at
43. The "no-fly zone" was first authorized by Security Council Resolution 816. S.C.
Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993). Although
the U.N. had authorized the deployment of airfield monitors in October 1992, these had
proved ineffective in preventing air activity over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
44. UNTED NATIONS, supra note 41, at 30.
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unacceptable risk. NATO commanders in the region understood this and
consulted closely with U.N. commanders, reaching common understand-
ing of what was, and what was not, possible. Similar understandings
between Brussels and New York were not apparent. Nonetheless, the U.N.
could learn much from NATO's process for political-military consultation,
its integrated military structure, its well-developed common doctrine, and
its staff training-all essential elements of a well functioning command and
control system.
A clear and effective command structure and process is an essential
component for peacekeeping. Without them, the kind of problems which
beset U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere will likely
persist.
J. Financial and Logistic Support
According to one former U.N. force commander, "administration is the sin-
gle most important determinant of success or failure for any peacekeeping
force in the field."45 While this might be arguable in the context of U.N.
operations in the former Yugoslavia, the lack of financial and logistical sup-
port contributed to the mission's failure. Problems with financial and
logistical support originated with the U.N. Secretariat and the pressures
associated with U.N. financial difficulties, unwillingness and inability to
delegate financial and logistical control, an inadequate logistical planning
staff, and local and international contracting difficulties. This, combined
with the lack of an integrated logistics and operations planning staff at
headquarters in New York and in the field, produced a system which was
often incapable of timely or adequate support to operations.
In order to sustain their operations, some UNPROFOR units had
recourse to national logistical resources. Other units went lacking and
their operational capability suffered. While some improvements were
made at the theater level through the collocation of military and civilian
logistical staffs, the system never responded adequately to operational
needs. When the decisions were made in May and August of 1995, follow-
ing Croatian seizures of Western Slavonia and the Krajina, to downsize the
Croatian operation, the contracting of air transport remained centralized in
New York. This resulted in long delays in the repatriation of troops and
additional cost as troops continued to be maintained, fed and accommo-
dated. Pleas to decentralize ffight contracting went unheeded.
There was a chronic problem with the control of fuel and other com-
modities. Individuals from several contingents were implicated in black
market dealings and fraud. In spite of efforts to improve control, the prob-
lem persisted. Efforts to improve the management of the financial and
logistical aspects of U.N. peacekeeping will, ultimately, improve both the
effectiveness and efficiency of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
45. EMMANUEL A EmsiarE, MISSION WITH UNIFIL: AN AmcAN SOLDIER'S REFLEcTIONS
46-48 (1989).
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Conclusion
It is perhaps ironic that after three and one-half years the U.N. mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which struggled without a peace to keep, was
replaced by a NATO force more than twice its size with a clear and appar-
ently achievable mandate. The international community may have gained
insights from a less than satisfactory U.N. experience in the former Yugo-
slavia. While it may be some time before we will know with certainty
whether the peoples of the former Yugoslavia will live in peace and secur-
ity, the case for optimism is stronger today than at any time since 1991.
Optimism results largely from the U.S.-led peace initiative begun in the
summer of 1995 and the peace accord which resulted from the efforts of
Richard Holbrooke and his team.4 6 Nonetheless, serious challenges and
ethnic division remain.
We will never know if the outcome in the former Yugoslavia might
have been different had the international community acted differently from
the outset. Those of us who served the international community in that
war-torn land would like to believe, in spite of all the difficulties, that we
helped create the necessary conditions for the political negotiations which
led to a peace agreement. In order to achieve that agreement, it may have
been necessary to endure three and one-half years of the U.N. experience.
The U.N. presence, supported as it was by NATO and others, helped
change the military balance, a factor which undoubtedly helped to achieve
a peace agreement. The military capability of Croatia, the Bosnian Govern-
ment, and the Federation were strengthened at the expense of the Serbs.
UNPROFOR was deployed because it was the lesser of two evils and
because it met the international community's demand for action. Yet, it
became the scapegoat for many when the intractability of the situation
increased.
Many of the difficulties faced by UNPROFOR might have been avoided
if the basic conditions for success were respected at the outset and as the
mandate evolved. The United Nations is not yet an effective body that can
undertake peacekeeping operations in semi-permissive, intra-state conflicts
and in situations where a peace agreement has not been achieved. If the
United Nations is to become a body capable of doing so, it must be
reformed and troops under its control must be provided with the tools
essential for success. To do otherwise is irresponsible. Fully respecting the
conditions for success, which the United Nations itself has identified, is a
good starting point.
It is heartening to note that the lessons learned from the U.N. experi-
ence in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere appear not to have been lost.
On July 16, 1997, the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, announced the
most extensive and far-reaching reform of the United Nations since it was
founded.4 7 Many of these reforms relate to international peace and secur-
ity. Some will address the problems identified in this Article. However,
46. Carl Mullins & Louise Branson, A Fragile Peace, MAcLEANs, Dec. 4, 1995, at 46.
47. Press Release 56/SM/6285, U.N. Doc. SG/2037/ORG/1239 (1997).
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those problems relating to the Security Council and to much needed
changes in the U.N. Charter require the attention of member states. With-
out urgent attention to these recommendations for reform, U.N. peacekeep-
ing efforts will continue to be severely limited. Attention to the conditions
for success and improving the understanding of them and their application
holds the promise of successful U.N. peacekeeping in aggravated intra-
state conflicts in the future-a future in which meaningful peace agree-
ments might be reached and the means necessary for their effective imple-
mentation will be available.
